Jordanian Journal of Law and Political Science, 2025

This article explores the enforceability of Third-Party Litigation Funding (TPLF) agreements used to finance litigation and arbitration under Jordanian law, focusing on the doctrinal, procedural, and public policy challenges they pose. Although Jordanian legislation does not expressly regulate TPLF, this article argues that such contracts may be treated as atypical (unnamed) contracts under Article 87 of the Civil Code, provided they satisfy the general conditions of validity and do not conflict with Article 165’s public order constraints. The article adopts a descriptive and comparative analytical methodology, drawing on foundational principles of Arab civil law, comparative case studies, and Islamic jurisprudential concepts such as gharar and maisir.

To illustrate these risks in the absence of statutory regulation, this article presents hypothetical models of permissible and impermissible TPLF structures. It demonstrates how excessive funder control or disproportionate profit-sharing may render such agreements unenforceable. Empirical data on access to justice barriers in Jordan reinforces the argument that TPLF addresses a systemic need, particularly given the high costs and long duration of litigation.

This article provides the first doctrinal analysis of TPLF enforceability in Jordan, based on proportionality, mutual benefit, and judicial integrity. It recommends enforceability thresholds and limited disclosure duties that preserve claimant autonomy while aligning with Jordanian public policy. The findings also contribute to broader debates in civil law jurisdictions regarding the role of private finance in litigation and the evolving boundaries of public order.